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Washington and New Delhi have cultivated what many believed was the most effective and consequential strategic partnership of the post–Cold War era for more than two decades. Now, that relationship is being put to the test as the trust and goodwill of the last 25 years hit a new low on multiple fronts, including tariffs, oil politics, and India’s global realignment.

“The trust is gone,” said Evan Feigenbaum, an expert on South Asia and director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Asia Program, in a phone interview. “We’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years — that everybody worked very hard to build, including the president in his first term — have just come completely unraveled.”

Feigenbaum was blunt as he assessed the current state of U.S.-India relations. Relations have soured, particularly since President Donald Trump announced major tariffs earlier this year on Indian goods over New Delhi’s continued purchase of Russian oil despite the war in Ukraine. The U.S. initially slapped a 25 percent tariff on Indian imports that will increase to 50 percent on August 27. Rather than drive India away from buying Russian oil, the tariff has only driven India further away from the United States and closer to Russia and China.

India’s national security adviser visited Moscow earlier this month, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar was in Moscow last week, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi just wrapped up his visit in New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is preparing for his first visit to China in more than seven years, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is also expected to welcome Modi in Moscow before the end of the year. Analysts say the diplomatic courting isn’t for show.

Indian public opinion has also solidified against what many in the country consider U.S. interference in its internal decision-making. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum added.

Despite some initial hesitation over buying Russian oil early in the war, state-run refiners have since doubled down after discounts on Russian crude of six to seven percent. The result: Russian oil now makes up 35 percent of India’s crude imports, up from 0.2 percent before the Ukraine conflict. Moscow has also stepped up to the plate, recognizing an opportunity. “We will continue to supply crude oil, oil products, thermal and coking coal,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov said at a news conference. He also noted the “potential for the export of Russian LNG.”

THE STRATEGIC DRIFT: TARIFFS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF SOVEREIGNTY

Tariffs are only one of many factors impacting India’s recent pivot toward Moscow, however. Michael Kugelman, the deputy director of the Asia Program at the Wilson Center and a South Asia analyst in Washington, told Prism, “We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons. But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly.”

Some of New Delhi’s recent decisions may be more for show, but others will have lasting effects. “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative,” Feigenbaum said. India had already been looking to diversify away from Russia before the Ukraine war and has found alternatives in the U.S., France, and Israel. But while India has found defense alternatives to Russia, the relationship with Moscow has grown stronger in energy trade since the war began. Kugelman said that “simply validates” the belief in New Delhi that the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what.”

Modi has leveraged the shift to boost his image at home. He has made a point of emphasizing his commitment to protecting the livelihoods of India’s farmers, small businesses, and young workers seeking jobs, a message that holds strong political sway at home. “India had already made these kinds of concessions to the United States on this range of issues that I think Modi is very loath to concede on, be it dropping tariffs or sending workers back home, or cutting off Russian oil,” Kugelman added, recalling that there was no new trade deal when the two leaders met at the UN General Assembly in New York in September. “Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down.”

Washington is growing frustrated. Peter Navarro, a former White House trade adviser who left earlier this year, argued in an op-ed published in the Financial Times that India’s oil purchases are “opportunistic” and “deeply corrosive.” Tariffs are one “tool” the United States can use to hit India “where it hurts — its access to U.S. markets — even as it seeks to cut off the financial lifeline it has extended to Russia’s war effort.”